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Abstract
We study a pricing problem where a seller has k identical copies of a product, buyers arrive
sequentially, and the seller prices the items aiming to maximize social welfare. When k = 1, this
is the so called prophet inequality problem for which there is a simple pricing scheme achieving a
competitive ratio of 1/2. On the other end of the spectrum, as k goes to infinity, the asymptotic
performance of both static and adaptive pricing is well understood.
We provide a static pricing scheme for the small-supply regime: where k is small but larger
than 1. Prior to our work, the best competitive ratio known for this setting was the 1/2 that
follows from the single-unit prophet inequality. Our pricing scheme is easy to describe as well
as practical – it is anonymous, non-adaptive, and order-oblivious. We pick a single price that
equalizes the expected fraction of items sold and the probability that the supply does not sell
out before all customers are served; this price is then offered to each customer while supply
lasts. This pricing scheme achieves a competitive ratio that increases gradually with the supply
and approaches to 1 at the optimal rate. Astonishingly, for k < 20, it even outperforms the
state-of-the-art adaptive pricing for the small-k regime [Ala11].
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1 Introduction
The prophet inequality problem of Krengel and Sucheston [KS77] constitutes one of the cornerstones
of online decision-making. A designer knows a set of n distributions from which random variables are
sequentially realized in an arbitrary order. Once a random variable is realized, the designer decides
whether to accept it or not; at most one realized random variable can be accepted. The objective is
to maximize the value of the variable accepted, and the performance of the algorithm is evaluated
against the ex-post maximum realized. In a beautiful result, Samuel-Cahn [SC84] showed that a
simple static threshold policy achieves the optimal competitive ratio for this problem. Samuel-Cahn’s
algorithm determines a threshold p such that the probability that there exists a realization exceeding
the threshold is exactly 1/2, and then accepts the first random variable that exceeds the threshold.
This algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1/2 against the ex-post optimum; no online algorithm,
even one with adaptive thresholds, can obtain better performance.
Over the last few years, many extensions of the basic prophet inequality to more general feasibility
constraints have been studied, and tight bounds on the competitive ratio have been established.
However, one simple natural extension has largely been overlooked: where the designer is allowed
to accept k > 1 random variables for some small value of k. This is called the multi-unit prophet
inequality. When k is relatively large, then it is known that static threshold policies can achieve
a competitive ratio of 1 − Θ
(√
log(k)
k
)
([HKS07]) which goes to 1 as k → ∞, and this ratio is
asymptotically tight [GK16]. However, (for example,) for k = 2 or 3, prior to our work, the best
known competitive ratio of static thresholds remained 1/2. Our work addresses this gap by posing
and answering the following questions:
Can a static threshold policy achieve a better competitive ratio than 1/2 for small k = 2, 3, . . .?
How should it be computed as a function of k? How does its performance scale with k?
The connection to mechanism design and static pricings. A primary motivation for our
work is its connection to welfare maximization in mechanism design. In this application, a seller
has one or more units of an item to sell. The distributions correspond to known priors on the
valuations of different customers (possibly heterogeneous), and the realizations correspond to the
actual valuation of an incoming customer. The seller’s goal is to maximize the social welfare, or the
sum of values of the customers that obtain the item. Any online strategy for the prophet inequality
problem corresponds to selecting prices for customers; customers buy if any units of the item are
still available and their valuation is higher than the price. Static threshold policies correspond to
static pricings, where the seller simply places a fixed price on the item and customers can purchase
the item at that price while supply lasts. Static pricings have many nice properties that make them
practical and suitable for real-world contexts. They are non-adaptive (the price does not depend on
which customers have already arrived) and order-oblivious (the price does not depend on the order
of customers). This makes their implementation simpler and removes any incentive on customers to
strategize on the arrival order to obtain a better price, enhancing the customer experience. Finally,
static pricing is anonymous (it does not discriminate based on which customer arrives), which is
typically regarded as a more fair pricing scheme. We therefore focus on static pricings in this work.
1.1 Our results
We answer the above questions by developing an algorithm for finding a static threshold policy for
the multi-unit prophet inequality that is sensitive to the supply k. Our algorithm is very simple and
practical. For any fixed price p, it estimates two statistics based on the given prior: (1) the fraction
1
of items expected to be sold at that price, µk(p), and (2) the probability that not all units will sell
out before all the customers have been served, δk(p). We then pick the static price p at which these
two quantities are equal: µk(p) = δk(p).
The competitive ratio of this static pricing increases gracefully as the supply increases and
approaches 1 at the rate of 1−Θ
(√
log(k)
k
)
as k →∞. As mentioned above, this dependence on k is
asymptotically optimal. The precise competitive ratio at any particular value of k can be determined
as the solution to a particular equation. Specifically, let X be a Poisson random variable with a rate
defined such that the following equation holds.
1
k
E[min(X, k)] = P[X ≤ k − 1]. (1.1)
The worst-case competitive ratio of our algorithm is then given by the value of either side of the
equation, say P[X ≤ k − 1]. Note that this quantity is well defined because on the one hand, the
truncated expectation 1k E[min(X, k)] increases with the rate of the Poisson variable X — it is 0
for rate equal to 0 and 1 for rate equal to infinity; on the other hand, the probability P[X ≤ k − 1]
decreases with the rate — it is 1 when the rate is 0 and 0 when the rate is infinity. In effect, our
analysis shows that the worst case for our static pricing occurs when the number of customers with
value exceeding the price is given precisely by the Poisson variable X.
To obtain a better sense of the exact quantities the above equation leads to, the competitive
ratio for k = 2, . . . , 6 is 0.585, 0.630, 0.660, 0.682 and 0.698 respectively. Figure 1 depicts the ratio
as a function of k.
Figure 1: Competitive ratio of our static pricing as a function of the number of supply units k.
1.2 Our techniques
Samuel-Cahn’s approach: Balancing revenue and utility contribution to welfare. Our
methodology is inspired by the approach of Samuel-Cahn [SC84] for the single-unit prophet inequality
(k = 1). First, the social welfare obtained by any static price p can be expressed in two parts: (1)
the expected revenue the seller obtains from selling any units of the item, and (2) the expected
utility the buyers obtain from purchasing any units of the item. What is the most revenue and
utility that we can expect at a particular price p? The most revenue the seller can obtain is simply
the price p, R(p) := p. On the other hand, the most total utility the buyers can obtain at a price of
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p is U(p) :=
∑
t max(0, vt − p), or the total excess value of the buyers above price p assuming that
everyone who wants the item gets it. 1 It turns out that no matter what p is, R(p) +U(p) is an upper
bound on the optimal-in-hindsight social welfare. Samuel-Cahn observed that when k = 1, with the
right choice of p both the seller and the buyers can in expectation each obtain at least a half of
these revenue and utility upper bounds respectively. One way to choose such a price p is to ensure
that the probability of selling the item is exactly 1/2. At that price, on the one hand the buyer sells
1/2 units in expectation, and on the other hand, each buyer has a probability at least 1/2 of being
offered the item and contributing to the total utility, resulting in the competitive ratio of 1/2.
Our extension to multiple units. Extending this approach beyond a single unit, we similarly
define Rk(p) := pk to be the revenue obtained if all k units of the item get sold at price p, and
U(p) :=
∑
t max(0, vt − p) to be the total excess value of the buyers above price p assuming that
everyone who wants the item at price p gets it. Then Rk(p) +U(p) is an upper bound on the optimal
in hindsight social welfare. Letting µk(p) denote the expected fraction of the supply sold at the price
p, the seller’s expected revenue is µk(p)Rk(p). On the other hand, the probability that a buyer is
offered an unsold unit is at least as large as the probability that not all units are sold out at the
end of the process; call this probability δk(p). Then the total utility contributed by the buyers is at
least δk(p)U(p). The static pricing p therefore obtains at least a φk := min{µk(p), δk(p)} fraction of
the upper bound Rk(p) + U(p). Our pricing scheme selects the price that maximizes this quantity
φk . Since µk(p) is a decreasing function of p and δk(p) is an increasing function, their minimum is
maximized when the two are equal. Note that φk only depends on the buyers’ value distributions
and is independent of their order as both µk(p) and δk(p) are also order-oblivious quantities.
Crux of our analysis: Characterizing worst-case performance of our scheme. The above
description quantifies the competitive ratio of our scheme for any known distribution. To characterize
its worst-case performance, we need to also identify worst-case distributions, i.e., those resulting to
the lowest φk. The crux of our analysis is a series of reductions eventually showing that Poisson
distributions are these worst-case distributions. As a result, the competitive ratio of our scheme is
φk for Poisson distributions and this leads to the competitive ratio we illustrated in (1.1).
1.3 Related work
As already discussed, prophet inequalities were introduced by Krengel and Sucheston [KS77]; Samuel-
Cahn [SC84] provided a very clean analysis that our work builds upon. In the last decade, there
has been a tremendous amount of work on extending prophet inequalities to different feasibility
constraints over buyers (e.g., [KW12, DK15, RS17]), as well as to pricing with heterogeneous items
where buyers have more complex valuations (e.g., [FGL14, DFKL17, CDH+17, CMT19]). The reader
is referred to [Luc17] for a general survey.
Balanced prices. The dominant approach for establishing prophet inequalities in combinatorial
settings is by constructing so-called balanced prices, a technique introduced by Kleinberg and
Weinberg [KW12] and further developed in [FGL14] and [DFKL17]. This approach also has its roots
in the work of Samuel-Cahn, and breaks up the contribution of any item to social welfare into a
revenue and a utility component. One can then show that every item contributes either good revenue
or good utility (but not necessarily both). By selecting prices in such a manner that both the revenue
1In the pricing application, customers are assumed to have quasi-linear utilities, i.e., they buy when their value is
above the price and there is an available item. In this case, they obtain payoff equal to their value minus the price.
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and utility components are large, one can obtain a constant factor approximation. This framework
provides the best known competitive ratios for prophet inequalities under a variety of feasibility
constraints. However, because of the manner in which balance is defined, it is inherently unable
to provide competitive ratios better than 1/2. In our k-unit setting, the balanced prices approach
suggests charging a price equal to a 1/2k fraction of the optimal-in-hindsight social welfare. It is easy
to construct examples where this price obtains competitive ratio no better than 1/2.
Adaptive pricing and the magician’s problem. Multi-unit prophet inequalities were also
previously studied by Alaei [Ala11] in the context of revenue optimal mechanism design. Alaei
provided a competitive ratio of αk := 1−
√
1
k+3 for a more general problem called the magician’s
problem, which applies also to the multi-unit prophet inequality. Alaei’s pricing scheme is not static;
in fact it satisfies none of the three properties mentioned above: non-adaptivity, anonymity, and order
obliviousness. As such it is much more powerful that the static pricings we consider. Alaei showed
that the competitive ratio of αk is exactly optimal for the magician’s problem at every value of k.
This has largely created the impression that this guarantee is also optimal for multi-unit prophet
inequalities. Surprisingly our work shows that this impression is mistaken: the static pricing we
develop provides a strictly better competitive ratio than that of Alaei for k ∈ [2, 20]. The reason our
static pricing beats Alaei’s pricing scheme is because the latter provides a stronger-than-necessary
performance guarantee: for every buyer, the mechanism obtains at least an αk fraction of the buyer’s
welfare contribution to the hindsight optimum. In contrast, static pricing obtains a higher fraction
of the welfare from buyers that arrive earlier in the ordering than those that arrive later.
Pricing with limited supply beyond prophet inequalities. Our work lies in the general theme
of providing supply-dependent guarantees for pricing with known priors and limited supply. Beyond
prophet inequalities, such guarantees have also been provided in ridesharing settings [BFL17, BBC19].
The latter works typically make a stronger assumption that the system is in steady state but has
more complex state externalities: in multi-unit prophet inequalities, the supply just decreases when
items are sold; in ridesharing it is reallocated across the network. To the best of our knowledge,
these are the only two pricing settings where such supply-dependent guarantees with known priors
and limited supply are provided; most prior work focuses on asymptotic optimality guarantees when
the supply is large.
When the priors are not known in advance, a few other lines of work attempt to address these
settings with the additional complication of learning information about the distributions. For
example, dynamic pricing with limited supply has been studied in the context of prior-independent
mechanisms, i.e., those that do not have distributional knowledge [BDKS12]; this work has been
then extended in more general bandit settings under Knapsack constraints [BKS18, AD14]. On the
positive side, these approaches do not assume knowledge of the distributions; on the negative side,
the guarantees they provide become meaningful only when the supply is large, e.g,
√
n where n is
the number of buyers.
2 Model
An instance of the prophet inequality problem consists of a set of n distributions supported on
non-negative real numbers F = {Ft : t ∈ [n]}. 2 In multi-unit prophet inequalities, there is also a
supply k that determines the number of units available for purchase at the beginning of time.
2For ease of presentation, we denote by Ft the t-th arriving distribution – this order is not known to the seller.
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A static pricing scheme p maps supply k and distributions F to a single number p(k,F) ∈ R.
We aim to understand the worst-case performance of static pricing schemes p as a function of k.
Static prices and pricing schemes. A static price is defined by a single number p ∈ R. The
pricing works as follows. Buyers arrive one by one and are offered a copy of the item at price p as
long as there is available supply. Buyer t has a value vt drawn independently from the distribution
Ft. The buyer purchases a unit of the item if and only if her value is above the price and there is
an available item. In this case, the available supply decreases by 1; otherwise the buyer leaves the
system without an item and the available supply remains unaltered. A static pricing scheme p maps
the supply k and the distributions F to a static price p(k,F) ∈ R.
Performance metric. The welfare of a static price p ∈ R on a particular realization of buyer
values is the total value of the buyers who purchase a unit of the item. We denote its expected
welfare by Welfare(p, k,F) where the expectation is over the randomness in buyer values drawn
from F .
The benchmark we compare to is the expected optimal welfare in hindsight and is denoted by
Opt(k,F), i.e., Opt(k,F) is the expected sum of the k highest realized values drawn from the set
of distributions F . The competitive ratio for a static pricing scheme p on supply k is the worst-case
welfare-to-optimum ratio across all the possible set of distributions F , i.e.,
CompRatio(p, k) = inf
F
Welfare
(
p(k,F), k,F)
Opt(k,F)
Our goal is to identify a static pricing scheme p(k,F) that maximizes this worst-case competitive
ratio. In the remainder of the presentation, we omit the arguments of p when clear from the context.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each distribution has P[vt > 0] > 0 (since otherwise
we can ignore it) and further assume that n > k (since otherwise setting a price of 0 is optimal).
Atomless assumption: To ease the presentation of our scheme, we assume that the distributions
are atomless. Remark 4 shows how our results extend to general distributions.
3 Our pricing scheme and its performance guarantee
Decomposing to revenue and utility contributions. For any fixed price p ∈ R and distribu-
tions F , let Xp denote the number of buyers who have value higher than the price. This is a random
variable since the values of the buyers are drawn from the distributions F ; in particular it is equal to:
Xp := |{t : vt ≥ p}|.
As in Samuel-Cahn’s approach, we decompose the welfare into two components: the total utility
obtained by the buyers and the total revenue obtained by the seller. We now define some quantities
of interest that determine these components. The first quantity is the probability that the seller
runs out of units to sell, or in other words, that Xp is at most k − 1. We use δk(Xp) to denote one
minus this probability:
δk(X) := P
[
X ≤ k − 1]. (3.1)
The second quantity is the expected fraction of units sold and is directly related to the revenue
obtained by the seller. We use µk(Xp) to denote this truncated expectation:
µk(X) :=
1
k
E
[
min{X, k}]. (3.2)
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The first important lemma that drives the design of our pricing scheme is that, for any distributions
F , the welfare-to-optimum ratio is at least the minimum of these two quantities.
Lemma 1. For any supply k, set of distributions F , and any price p ∈ R:
Welfare
(
p, k,F)
Opt(k,F) ≥ min
(
δk(Xp), µk(Xp)
)
.
This lemma is the main structural contribution of our work to the prophet inequality literature. Its
proof is deferred to Section 4.
Our pricing scheme. For a given set of distributions F and supply k, our pricing scheme p
outputs a static price p(k,F) = p¯ that ensures that the two quantities in Lemma 1 are equalized:
δk
(
Xp¯
)
= µk
(
Xp¯
)
. (3.3)
The atomless assumption ensures that such a price always exists (see Remark 4 on how the results
extend beyond the atomless assumption). Observe that δk(Xp) is monotone non-decreasing in p and
µ(Xp) is monotone non-increasing in p. Moreover, µk(Xp) goes from 1 to 0 as the price goes from 0
to ∞ (since n > k). The atomless assumption ensures that both δk(Xp) and µk(Xp) are continuous.
The intermediate value theorem then guarantees the existence of p¯.
We now define the competitive ratio of our pricing scheme for any distributions F and supply k:
φk(p,F) := δk(Xp(k,F)) = µ(Xp(k,F)
)
and the worst-case competitive ratio of p as
φk(p) := infF
φk(p,F) (3.4)
The second important lemma that enables our competitive ratio guarantee is that, for any fixed
supply k, the minimum of δk(Xp(k,F)
)
and µk(Xp(k,F)
)
attains its lowest value when F consists
of infinitely many Bernoulli random variables, all with equal bias; in this case, Xp is a Poisson
distribution. This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any supply k and any set of distributions F , let p(k,F) be the price such that
δk(Xp(k,F)) = µ(Xp(k,F)
)
. φk(p,F) attains its lowest value φk(p) when F is a collection of infinitely
many Bernoulli distributions with equal bias, i.e., Xp(k,F) is a Poisson distribution.
The proof of this lemma stems from a series of reductions and is the main technical contribution
of our analysis. Its proof is deferred in Section 5.
Competitive ratio of our pricing scheme. The above two lemmas seamlessly establish the
competitive ratio of our pricing scheme as demonstrated in the following theorem which is the main
result of our work. The competitive ratio φk as a function of k is illustrated in Figure 1.
Theorem 3. Let Xλ be a Poisson random variable with rate λ and set λk such that δk
(
Xλk
)
=
µk
(
Xλk
)
. The competitive ratio of our pricing scheme is at least φk := δk(Xλk) = µk(Xλk).
Proof. The proof of the theorem comes directly by combining Lemmas 1 and 2.
Remark 4. If there are point masses in the distributions at price p¯, we still obtain the same results
provided we can break ties at random. A buyer with value p¯ is allocated the item with a probability
such that equality (3.3) holds. The definition of Xp¯ is adjusted accordingly: if vt = p¯, then t is
counted only with some probability. The same effect can be achieved by randomly perturbing the
price by an infinitessimal amount (although not static, this is still anonymous, non-adaptive and
order-oblivious).
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4 Welfare-to-optimum lower bound for any price (Lemma 1)
This section proves Lemma 1: for any supply k, set of distributions F , and any price p ∈ R, we have
Welfare
(
p, k,F)
Opt(k,F) ≥ min
(
δk(Xp), µk(Xp)
)
,
where δk(X) := P
[
X ≤ k− 1] and µk(X) := E [min{X, k}/k] as introduced in Equations (3.1) and
(3.2).
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof follows the approach of Samuel-Cahn for the single-unit prophet
inequality. We first bound the hindsight optimal welfare from above in terms of the price p by
bounding both the maximum possible revenue generated for the seller and the maximum possible
utility generated for the buyers when posting price p. Let Zp denote the (random) set of buyers
whose value exceeds the price p. Then we have:
Opt(k,F) = E
[
max
S⊆[n];|S|≤k
∑
t∈S
vt
]
≤ E
[
max
S⊆[n];|S|≤k
∑
t∈S
(p+ max(0, vt − p))
]
≤ kp+E
∑
t∈Zp
(vt − p)
 ≤ kp+ ∑
t∈[n]
P[t ∈ Zp] E [vt − p|t ∈ Zp] . (4.1)
We note that the first summand in the last term corresponds to what we referred in the introduction
as Rk(p) = kp while the second summand corresponds to the expected value of what we referred in
the introduction as U(p) =
∑
tE[max
(
0, vt − p
)
].
We now decompose the expected welfare generated by price p to a revenue and a utility component.
The expected revenue of the seller upon setting price p is:
Revenue(p, k,F) = E
[
min
(|Zp|, k)] p = µk(Xp)kp. (4.2)
On the other hand, a buyer t receives utility of vt−p if and only if: (1) vt is at least p, that is, t ∈ Zp;
and, (2) the item is still available when the buyer t arrives. Regardless of the order in which buyers
arrive, the latter event happens with probability at least as large as the probability that the item is
not sold out at the end of the process. Recall that this latter probability is δ(Xp) = P[Xp ≤ k − 1].
We therefore get the following lower bound on the utility generated by the pricing p:
Utility(p, k,F) ≥
∑
t∈[n]
δk(Xp) · P[t ∈ Zp]E [vt − p|t ∈ Zp] . (4.3)
The proof of the lemma is completed by putting 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 together, which obtains that:
Welfare(p, k,F) = Revenue(p, k,F) +Utility(p, k,F)
≥ µk(Xp)kp+ δk(Xp)
∑
t∈[n]
P[t ∈ Zp]E [vt − p|t ∈ Zp]
≥ min (µk(Xp), δk(Xp))Opt(k,F).
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5 Establishing Poisson as worst-case distribution (Lemma 2)
This section proves Lemma 2. Recall that for any supply k and any set of distributions F , p(k,F)
is the price that satisfies δk(Xp(k,F)) = µ(Xp(k,F)
)
. We show that the corresponding competitive
ratio φk(p) attains its lowest value when F is a collection of infinitely many Bernoulli distributions
with equal bias, i.e., Xp(k,F) is a Poisson distribution.
Proof sketch. To prove the above lemma, we progressively refine our understanding of the worst-case
distributions, as outlined in the following 3 steps.
1. We reduce the problem of finding the worst distribution to a finite dimensional problem searching
only over Bernoulli distributions (Section 5.1). Intuitively, our analysis is only affected by the
probability that vt ≥ p(k,F) corresponding to the bias of a Bernoulli distribution.
2. We show that all the Bernoulli biases are equal unless they are either 0 or 1 (Section 5.2) .
3. We show that the Bernoullis in fact must all have the same bias (Section 5.3).
The lemma then follows by considering n Bernoullis with the same bias and letting n tend to infinity.
The complete proof is provided at the end of the section.
5.1 Reducing to Bernoulli distributions
Reducing worst-case distributions to Bernoulli distributions. A Bernoulli random variable
with bias b takes on the value 1 with probability b and 0 otherwise. We reduce the problem of finding
the worst-case distribution to the following finite dimensional problem.
φ?k := min
b1,b2,...,bn,φ
φ s.t. (5.1)
X is the sum of n Bernoullis with bias b1, b2, . . . , bn
δk(X) = µk(X) = φ.
Lemma 5. For any supply k > 0, number n > k of customers, and pricing scheme p as defined
above, the optimal value of Problem (5.1), φ?k, is exactly equal to φk(p).
Proof. φk(p) optimizes the objective of the optimization problem (5.1) across any set of prior
distributions while the optimization problem (5.1) optimizes only over Bernoulli distributions. We
now show that for every set of prior distributions, there exists a corresponding set of Bernoulli
distributions that are feasible for (5.1) and obtain the same objective function value.
The reduction is relatively simple. For any set of distributions F (not necessarily Bernoulli),
we first compute the price p(k,F) that makes δk
(
Xp(k,F)
)
= µk
(
Xp(k,F)
)
. Subsequently, for each
distribution Ft, we compute an equivalent Bernoulli bias bt = P[vt ≥ p(k,F)]. The probability that
any Bernoulli random variable is 1 is therefore equal to the probability that its original counterpart
is higher than the price p(k,F). As a result, both δk(·) and µk(·) are the same for the resulting sum
as in the original problem which proves the lemma.
A simpler equivalent way to express the resulting optimization problem. We now define
a slightly different form of the objective function which makes analyzing the optimal setting of the
biases easier. Here φ?k is the optimal value of Problem (5.1):
minµk(X) s.t. (5.2)
δk(X) = φ
?
k
X is the sum of Bernoulli r.v.s
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Lemma 6. The optimal value of the optimization problem (5.2) is equal to φ?k.
Proof. The optimal solution for (5.1) is feasible for (5.2) as the latter program needs to satisfy a
subset of the former program’s constraints; thus the optimum of (5.2) is no larger than the one
of (5.1). For the opposite direction, assume that the optimum of (5.2) is strictly smaller than the
one of (5.1). Since δk(X) and µk(X) are both continuous, and monotone decreasing and increasing
respectively, by increasing any of the biases, starting from the optimal solution of (5.2), we arrive to
a new solution X ′, with δk(X ′) = µk(X ′) < δk(X) = φ?k. This contradicts the fact that φ
?
k was the
optimum for (5.1) and establishes that the optimum of (5.2) is not smaller than the one of (5.1).
5.2 Reducing to Bernoulli distributions with equal bias unless degenerate
We now show that the optimum of Problem (5.2) is attained when all the Bernoulli distributions
have either equal bias or are degenerate (with bias 0 or 1).
Lemma 7. The optimization problem (5.2) is minimized when all non-degenerate Bernoulli distri-
butions (that do not have bias 0 or 1) have equal bias.
High-level structure of the reduction. The key idea of the proof is to fix all but two of the
biases and consider the problem of minimizing µk(X) subject to δk(X) being fixed as a function of
these two biases. This is a problem in two dimensions, and we can characterize the optimal solutions
to this problem. We then set aside these two distributions and assume by the principle of deferred
decisions that they are instantiated in the end. The eventual goal is to establish that µk(X) is
minimized when these two biases are equal or degenerate (either 0 or 1). By working inductively on
the number of biases that are not equal and are non-degenerate, we eventually establish that all
biases should be equal or degenerate.
Formally, assume that we have n Bernoulli distributions and fix all but two biases; let b1 and b2
be these two biases and refer to r1 = 1− b1 and r2 = 1− b2 as the rates of the respective random
variables. Denote by X¯ the sum of random variables drawn from the remaining n− 2 distributions.
Let Q1 be the probability that X¯ = k − 1 (equivalently, exactly one unit is left available for the last
two distributions), Q2 the probability that X¯ = k − 2 (i.e., two units are left available), and Q≥3
the probability that X¯ ≤ k − 3 (i.e. more than two units are left available). Finally, recall that X is
the sum of random variables drawn from all distributions.
The following two claims enable the proof of Lemma 7.
Claim 8. The problem of minimizing µk(X) as a function of r1 and r2 subject to δk(X) = φ?k for a
constant value φ?k is captured by the following program:
Maximize
(
Q2 +Q≥3
)
·
(
r1 + r2
)
+Q1r1r2 (Min-Revenue)
subject to r1, r2 ∈ [0, 1]2 and r1r2 ·
(
Q1 −Q2
)
+
(
r1 + r2
)
·Q2 = φ?k −Q≥3 (5.3)
Claim 9. There always exists an optimal solution for the (Min-Revenue) program that satisfies
r1 = r2, or r1 ∈ {0, 1}, or r2 ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, when (Q2)2 − Q≥3(Q1 − Q2) > 0, the unique
optimal solution satisfies r1 = r2.
Using the above two claims, we can directly provide the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7. Among all the optimal solutions for Problem (5.2), consider the one that satisfies
the following conditions. First, it has the fewest Bernoulli variables that are non-degenerate. Second,
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among those, it has the smallest difference between the largest non-degenerate bias and the smallest
non-degenerate bias; call these biases h and s accordingly. Third, among those, it has the smallest
number of variables with bias that is equal to either h or s. We show, by contradiction, that h = s,
establishing that all non-degenerate biases are equal.
Among all the optimal solutions, we select the one satisfying the above criteria, and we select two
distributions with bias b1 = h and b2 = s respectively. We apply Claim 8 with these two and express
(5.2) as a function of r1 = 1− b1, r2 = b2, and quantities Q1, Q2, Q≥3 that are independent of r1
and r2. Claim 9 establishes that there exists another optimal solution with all the other biases the
same and the biases b′1 and b′2 corresponding to the two distributions either satisfy b′1 = b′2, or have
one them be degenerate. The latter is a contradiction as we assumed that the above solution has
the smallest number of non-degenerate Bernoulli distributions. This means that b′1 = b′2. However,
in order for the new solution to induce the same δk(·) and µk(·), it means that b2 ≤ b′1 = b′2 ≤ b1.
Unless b1 = b2, we have therefore identified a new optimal solution with fewer number of variables
with bias equal to h or s which again would induce contradiction. As a result, b1 = b2 and since
b1 = h and b2 = s, this means that h = s and all non-degenerate biases are equal.
Expressing optimization problem (5.2) as a function of two biases (Claim 8).
Proof of Claim 8. We first write the utility component δk(X), i.e., the probability that not all k
items are sold, in terms of the probabilities Q1, Q2, and Q≥3, and the biases r1 and r2:
δk(X) = Q≥3 +Q2(r1 + r2 − r1r2) +Q1r1r2
Applying this equation in the constraint of optimization probelm (5.2) leads to the constraint (5.3)
of the (Min-Revenue) optimization problem.
Our goal is now to minimize the objective of (5.2) which corresponds to the revenue component
µk(X), i.e., the expected fraction of items sold. Since all but biases b1 and b2 are kept constant, this
is equivalent to minimizing the number of items sold to the remaining two buyers. Our objective is
therefore to minimize the following expression:(
r1(1− r2) + r2(1− r1)
)
·
(
Q1 +Q2 +Q≥3
)
+
(
1− r1
)
·
(
1− r2
)
·
(
Q1 + 2Q2 + 2Q≥3
)
The first term corresponds to the contribution of the two remaining buyers when only one of the
two realized random variables is non-zero: then µk(X) is increased if there exists at least one item
that is left available from the other buyers. The second term corresponds to the event that both
buyers have non-zero realized random variables: in this case, µk(X) is increased by 1 if exactly one
available item is left from the other buyers and 2 if at least two available items are left. Simplifying
the expression leads to the following minimization objective:(
Q1 + 2Q2 + 2Q≥3
)
−
(
Q2 +Q≥3
)
·
(
r1 + r2
)
−Q1r1r2
Eliminating constant terms and negating the objective offers the maximization objective of the
claim.
Auxiliary geometric interpretation of the constraint intersection with [0, 1]2. We now
provide a geometric fact about hyperbolas of a particular form which is useful in characterizing the
optimal solutions of the Min-Revenue program.
Claim 10. Let a, b ∈ R, and consider the hyperbola in the x, y plane given by xy + a(x+ y) = b.
Expressing it as y = g(x), and considering the segment(s) of g that intersect the region [0, 1]2, the
following holds:
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• when a, b > 0, and 2a+ 1− b > 0, the segment of g intersecting [0, 1]2 is convex and decreasing.
• when a, b < 0, and 2a+1−b < 0, the segment of g intersecting [0, 1]2 is concave and decreasing.
Proof. In both cases considered, a2 + b > 0. In the first case, this is straightforward as a, b > 0. In
the second case, 2a+ 1 < b and adding a2, we obtain a2 + 2a+ 1 < a2 + b, implying a2 + b > 0. If
x = −a, then it means that ax = b and hence −a2 = b; this contradicts the fact that a2 + b > 0.
As a result, x 6= −a and the hyperbola can be expressed as y = b−axx+a . The first derivative of this
function is dydx =
−a(x+a)−(b−ax)
(x+a)2
= (−b−a
2)
(x+a)2
. This is negative as a2 + b > 0 which establishes that y is
decreasing in x. The second derivative of this function is d
2y
dx2
= −2 (−b−a2)
(x+a)3
= 2 a
2+b
(x+a)3
. The convexity
or concavity is determined by the sign of this derivative which is determined by the sign of x+ a.
Hence the resulting hyperbola has two segments, one convex for x > −a and one concave for x < −a.
• In the first case, since both x ≥ 0 and a > 0, this sign is positive and the segment is convex.
• In the second case, because of the symmetry, if the convex segment intersects [0, 1]2, it should
also intersect it at x = y. Hence, the point of this intersection is given by the equation
x2 + ax = b whose roots are x = −a ± √a2 + b. The negative root −a − √a2 − b < 0 and
the positive root is −a+√a2 − b > −a+√a2 + 2a+ 1 > 1 (since 2a+ 1 < b). As a result,
the convex segment does not intersect with [0, 1]2 and, if the hyperbola does intersect, this
happens with its concave segment.
Characterizing the optimal solutions of the Min-Revenue program (Claim 9).
Proof of Claim 9. We first start from two corner cases.
I(a): We start from the simplest case where Q2 = 0. This transforms the Min-Revenue program to:
maximize (r1 + r2) +Q1r1r2 subject to Q1r1r2 = φ?k −Q≥3.
In this case, depending on the sign of φ?k −Q≥3, the optimal solution either satisfies r1 = r2 or
r1 ∈ {0, 1} or r2 ∈ {0, 1} (if Q1 6= 0) or is independent of r1, r2 (otherwise).
I(b): We then consider the case where Q1 = Q2 > 0 (where it also holds that (Q2)2−Q≥3(Q1−Q2) >
0); then the constraint (5.3) is a linear constraint symmetric in r1 and r2 whereas the objective
becomes equivalent to maximizing r1r2. The optimum is therefore uniquely achieved at r1 = r2.
For the remaining cases, we assume that Q2 > 0 and Q1 6= Q2. We can therefore rewrite the
objective in terms of r1 + r2, obtaining the following equivalent formulation:
Minimize (r1 + r2) · (Q2)
2 −Q≥3(Q1 −Q2)
Q1 −Q2
subject to r1, r2 ∈ [0, 1]2 and r1r2 + (r1 + r2) · Q2
Q1 −Q2 =
φ?k −Q≥3
Q1 −Q2
The constraint can be rewritten as r1r2 + a(r1 + r2) = b for a = Q2Q1−Q2 and b =
φ?k−Q≥3
Q1−Q2 .
Observe that unless r1 = r2 = 1 is the only feasible solution (in which case the claim is already
proven), it holds that Q1 −Q2 + 2Q2 > r1r2(Q1 −Q2) + (r1 + r2)Q2 = φ?k −Q≥3 > 0.3 Hence, it
3Note that for any feasible solution we have φ?k = δk(X) ≥ Q2 +Q≥3 > Q≥3. So, φ?k −Q≥3 > 0.
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holds that a, b, and 1 + 2a− b all have the same sign and this is the sign of Q1 −Q2. By Claim 10,
the hyperbola r2 = g(r1) corresponding to the constraint is always decreasing and is a) convex when
Q1 > Q2 (a > 0) and b) concave when Q1 < Q2 (a < 0); it is also always symmetric in r1, r2.
II(a) If Q1 < Q2, which implies (Q2)2−Q≥3(Q1−Q2) > 0, the multiplier of the objective is negative
in this case; therefore our goal is to maximize r1 + r2 subject to a concave and decreasing
constraint. As a result, the optimum is uniquely determined on the line r1 = r2.
II(b) If Q1 > Q2 and (Q2)2−Q≥3(Q1−Q2) > 0 the multiplier of (r1 +r2) in the objective is positive;
therefore our goal is to minimize (r1 + r2) subject to a convex and decreasing constraint. As a
result, the optimum is uniquely determined on the line r1 = r2.
II(c) If Q1 > Q2 and (Q2)2 − Q≥3(Q1 − Q2) < 0, the multiplier of (r1 + r2) in the objective is
negative; therefore our goal is to maximize (r1 + r2) subject to a convex and decreasing
constraint. As a result, the optimum lies on the boundary of [0, 1]2.
The last case is that (Q2)2 −Q≥3(Q1 −Q2) = 0 Then, if the program is feasible, there is a feasible
solution with r1 = r2 or with one of r1, r2 be in {0, 1} via a similar reasoning as above.
Finally, (Q2)2 −Q≥3(Q1 −Q2) = 0 > 0 corresponds to the cases I(b), II(a), and II(b). In all
three cases, r1 = r2 is the unique optimal solution.
5.3 Reducing to the Poisson distribution
Lemma 7 states that the optimal solution to (5.2) is such that some of the biases are 0 or 1, and the
remainder have equal bias bt = 1− r. We now show that in fact there cannot be any 0 or 1 biases.
Lemma 11. The optimization problem (5.2) is minimized when all of the Bernoulli distributions
have equal bias (and there are no degenerate distributions).
Proof. By Lemma 7, we know that there exists an optimal solution that consists of Bernoulli
distributions with bias 0, 1, or 1 − r for a fixed r. Consider any such optimal solution. We first
observe that this solution cannot have k or more Bernoullis with bias 1, otherwise δk(X) = 0 < φ?k.
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Now, we pick two specific Bernoulli variables with unequal bias and reoptimize the objective over
these, keeping the rest fixed. If there is a Bernoulli with bias 1 and another with bias 1− r 6= 1, we
pick two such variables. Otherwise, we pick one variable with bias 1− r and another with bias 0. We
define Q1, Q2, and Q≥3 as in Section 5.2. In either case, we argue that (Q2)2 −Q≥3(Q1 −Q2) > 0.
Then applying Claim 9, we arrive at a contradiction to the claim that our initial solution was optimal.
Among the biases left fixed, let n1 denote the number of Bernoullis with bias 1, and nr denote
the number with bias 1− r. As discussed previously, we note n1 ≤ k− 2. Let k′ = k−n1 ≥ 2 denote
the number of item units left available once the n1 Bernoullis with bias 1 have each acquired an
item. Recall that Q1 is the probability that exactly 1 unit is left available for the two Bernoullis
from the others. Rephrasing, Q1 is the probability that of the remaining Bernoullis, exactly k − 1
take a non-zero value. Since n1 Bernoullis take on a non-zero value with certainty, this means that
among the nr Bernoullis with bias 1− r, exactly k′ − 1 take on a non-zero value where k′ = k − n1.
Likewise, Q2 is the probability that among the nr Bernoullis with bias 1− r, exactly k′ − 2 take on
a non-zero value, and Q≥3 is the probability that among the nr Bernoullis with bias 1− r, at most
k′ − 3 take on a non-zero value. Let us also define Qi for i ≥ 3 as the probability that among the nr
Bernoullis with bias 1− r, exactly k′ − i take on a non-zero value. Observe that since k′ ≥ 2, we
must have Q1, Q2 > 0.
4This holds since φ?k is at least 1/2 as it is the intended competitive ratio.
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We first claim that k′ ≥ 3. If not, then we have Q≥3 = 0, which implies (Q2)2−Q≥3(Q1−Q2) > 0
and completes the proof. We can now compute the probabilities Qi:
Q1 =
(
nr − 1
k′ − 1
)
(1− r)k′−1rnr−k′ , Q2 =
(
nr − 1
k′ − 2
)
(1− r)k′−2rnr−k′+1, etc.
Let us denote by α the ratio between Q2 and Q1:
α =
Q2
Q1
=
k′ − 1
nr − k′ + 1 ·
r
1− r
We then observe:
Q3
Q2
=
k′ − 2
nr − k′ + 2 ·
r
1− r < α and likewise,
Qi+1
Qi
≤ k
′ − i
nr − k′ + i ·
r
1− r < α ∀i > 3 with Qi > 0
Here the second inequality follows by noting that k
′−i
nr−k′+i decreases with i.
We can therefore write Q≥3 =
∑
i≥3Qi < Q1(α
2 + α3 + · · · ) = α2Q1/(1 − α). Putting these
expressions together we obtain:
(Q2)
2 −Q≥3(Q1 −Q2) > α2Q21 − α2
Q1
1− α(Q1 − αQ1) = 0.
This completes the proof.
We are now ready to provide the proof of th main lemma of the section.
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 5, φk(F) attains its lowest value when all the distributions are
Bernoulli. By Lemma 7, all these Bernoulli distributions either have equal biases or are degenerate
(have 0 or 1 bias). By Lemma 11, there exists an optimal solution with no degenerate Bernoulli
distributions. If there are finite Bernoulli distributions, we can always repeat the argument of
Lemma 11 and obtain a solution with strictly higher objective and one more non-zero bias. As a
result, the exists an optimal solution that consists of an infinite collection of Bernoulli distributions
with the same bias. This establishes that the worst-case instance is the limit n→∞ and the quantity
Xp(k,F) in this limit is a Poisson distribution.
6 Conclusions
This paper focuses on providing an understanding of the performance of static pricing in multi-unit
prophet inequalities. We show a simple static pricing scheme that obtains a competitive ratio that
adapts to the size of the supply. This is enabled by a clean revenue-utility decomposition which
allows to move beyond the now dominant balanced approach to analyze prophet inequalities. We
hope that this decomposition can further our understanding of prophet inequalities for more settings.
While our work provides a significant improvement in the competitive ratio of static pricing for
small values of k (the first competitive ratio beyond 1/2 for static pricing), we do not know if these
ratios are tight. Understanding whether the competitive ratio can be improved via another static
pricing scheme, or constructing improved lower bounds, are intriguing directions for future work.
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